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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Sections 35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the filing limitations found in Utah Code Ann.

Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 violate the open court provision of
the Utah Constitution?

2.

Whether Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66

arbitrarily impose time limitations for filing claims for workers1
compensation benefits in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Utah Constitution?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A correction of error standard giving no deference to the
Industrial

Commission's

interpretation

of

appropriate standard of review in this case.

the

law

is

the

Utah Code Ann. §63-

46b-16 (4) (a) and 63-46b-16 (4) (d) Velarde v. Board of Review.
831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992), Avis v. Board of Review. 194
Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1992)

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The applicable versions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and 35-1-66
and Article I, §11 and Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution are
set forth verbatim in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case:
This is an action wherein the petitioner is seeking

judicial review of the Order of the Industrial Commission dated
March 12, 1992 denying Petitioner^ Motion for Review.
B.

Re 54-57

Course of Proceedings:
On May 21, 1992, Petitioner filed an Application for

Hearing with the Industrial Commission of Utah seeking, among other
-2-

things, additional temporary total disability and permanent partial
disability benefits.

R. 11

Following an attorney conference, which was scheduled on
November 10, 1991, at the request of respondent's counsel, the
Administrative Law Judge entered on Order of Dismissal. R. 15, 38
On December 17, 1991, Petitioner filed his Motion for
Review with the Industrial Commission.

R. 41-45

That motion was

denied and the Order of Dismissal was affirmed on March 12, 1992.
R. 54-57
Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Review with
this court on April 10, 1992. R. 59

This court issued such writ

on April 10, 1992. R. 61
C.

Disposition by the Industrial Commission:
On March 12, 1992, the Industrial Commission affirmed the

Order of Dismissal of the Administrative Law Judge by concluding
that the Petitioners claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. 35-1-65
and 35-1-66.

R. 54-57
RELEVANT FACTS

Respondents agree the relevant facts are as set forth in
Petitioner's Brief which are copied here from Petitioner's Brief
for the convenience of the court.
1.

Petitioner, hereinafter "Mr. Middlestadt,M was injured in

an industrial accident on August 16, 1976, (with Mountain Fuel
Supply) and December 5, 1980 (with Comtrol, Inc.) R. 4, 8, 18, 26.
2.

On April 2, 1985, following an evidentiary hearing and

the issuance of a medical panel report, the Administrative Law
-3-

Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
awarding Mr. Middlestadt, among other things, temporary disability
benefits and permanent partial disability benefits as a result of
the August 16, 1976 and December 5, 1980, industrial accidents. R.
3-10
3.

The Respondents

have paid

pursuant to the April 2, 1985, Order.
4.

Mr. Middlestadt

benefits

R. 11, 27

Mi:. Middlestadt had back surgeries on or about November

16, 1987, and October 24, 1990.

These surgeries are secondary to

the original industrial injuries of August 16, 1976 and December 5,
1980.

R. 35, 141

5.

On May 21, 1991, Mr. Middlestadt filed an Application for

Hearing seeking, among other things, additional temporary total and
permanent partial disability benefits for the injuries he sustained
in the August 16, 1976, and December 5# 1980, industrial accidents.
R. 11
6.

Following a November 19, 1991, attorney conference [R.

32], which conference was requested by Counsel for Respondents [R.
15], the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order of Dismissal on
November 21, 1991. R. 38
7.

The Administrative

Law

Judge

entered

his

Order

of

Dismissal of his own volition, without Motion by Respondents and
without entering any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (he
concluded there was no justiciable issue).
8.

R. 38

The medical evidence before the Industrial Commission

supports Mr. Middlestadt•s claims. Dr. J. Lynn Smith has indicated
-4-

that Mr. Middlestadt•s November 16, 1987, and October 24, 1990,
surgeries "are secondary to" the August 16, 1976 and December 5,
1980, industrial accidents.

R. 141

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The critical issue to be resolved by this court is whether the
time limitations for filing of claims under Utah Code Ann. S35-1-65
and §35-1-66 violate provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Mr. Middlestadt contends that he could not file for additional
workers1 compensation benefits until he had surgeries in November
1987 and October 1990. Obviously, if the December 5, 1980 injury
contributed to the need for surgery, Mr. Middlestadt clearly could
have filed a timely claim following the November 1987 surgery, but
the October 1990 surgery does raise the statute of limitations
issue.

The statute provides for payment of medical expenses

necessitated by industrial accidents for an indefinite period of
time but the statute does set an eight year limit for which the
employer and/or insurance carrier is liable for the payment of
weekly compensation benefits.
Petitioner argues that to affirm the Industrial Commission's
denial of benefits is not just unfair and unjust but is absurd.
This argument is without merit.
with respect

to most

any

The same argument could be made

statute of

limitations

or statute

providing defined benefits and completely fails to recognize the
appropriateness and reasons why most statutory rights involve some
appropriate limits or limitation of time within which claims can be
asserted.

In the strictest sense, the period of limitation for
-5-

awarding benefits set forth in §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are neither a
statute of repose nor a statue of limitations.

It is simply a

limitation on the amount of compensation which an injured worker is
entitled to receive and the period of time within which the weekly
benefits

must

be

incurred.

Medical

benefits

can

continue

indefinitely.
In resolving an issue very similar to the issue presented
here, this court has recently ruled in Avis v. Board of Review, 194
Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1992) contrary to the assertions of
Petitioner, the limitations set forth in the act itself neither
violate the Hopen courts" provision nor the equal protection clause
of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
1.
THE LIMITATIONS OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY WEEKLY
COMPENSATION BENEFITS IN SECTION 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 ARE NEITHER
STATUTES OF REPOSE NOR STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND ARE NOT
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, THE "OPEN COURTS" PROVISION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
It is WCFfs position that Section 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 are not
violative of the "Open Courts11 provision of the Utah Constitution.
Section 35-1-65 U.C.A. states in pertinent part:

...In no case shall such compensation
benefits
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury over a period of eight years from the
date of the
injury.

Section 35-1-66 U.C.A., prior to the 1988 amendment, stated in
pertinent part:
-6-

The Commission may make a permanent
petrtial
disability
award at any time prior to eight
years after the date of injury to any employee
whose physical
condition resulting
from such
injury is not finally
healed and fixed
eight
years after the date of injury and who files
an Application
for such purpose prior to the
expiration
of such eight year
period.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every
person,
for an injury
done to him in his
person,
property or reputation,
shall have a remedy by
due course of law, which shall be
administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting
or
defending before any tribunal in this
state,
by himself or counsel, any civil case to which
he is a party.
Middlestadt argues in his memorandum that Section 35-1-65
U.C.A. is an unconstitutional statute of repose.

The first thing

this court should recognize is that Section 35-1-65 U.C.A. is
technically neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of
repose.

Instead,

it places a limitation

on the amount of

compensation which an injured worker is entitled to receive with
respect to the dollar amount, the total number of weeks of
compensation and the period of time after the accident within which
the weekly benefits must be incurred.

It does not totally bar the

right to compensation benefits.

In fact, medical benefits can

continue

remain

indefinitely

if

they

reasonably

necessary,

reasonably related to the industrial accident fKennecott Copper
Corporation v. Industrial Comm'n. 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979)] and
provided there is not a greater gap than three years between the
incurrence of the expenses and further provided the expenses are

-7-

submitted to the employer or insurance carrier within that three
year period.

Section 35-1-99(2) , U.C.A., 1988.

In the context of the Occupational Disease Act, Section 35-2-1
et. seq. U.C.A. which is equally applicable to the Workers1
Compensation Act, this court stated the proposition that "[t]he
Legislature clearly has power to alter the form of or to limit [a
diseased workmanfs] compensation for his disease.11

Wrolstad v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990) at
244.
The concept of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose
is that each wholly bars a personfs right.

With a statue of

limitations the right is barred with the passage of a specific
period after the individual discovers or should have discovered
that he or she has a right. With a statute of repose, the right is
barred after a specific period of time even if the person could not
reasonably have discovered the existence of the right.

See, i.e.

discussions in Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989);
Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission of Utah., supra.; Sun Valley
Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188
(Utah 1989). Notwithstanding Mr. Middlestadtfs mis-categorization
of the damage limitation period of Section 35-1-65 U.C.A., the
proper analysis for determining the constitutionality of a statute
of

limitation

or statute of repose under the

"open courts"

provision has been set forth clearly by the Utah Supreme Court in
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra.:
-8-

We hold that [the open courts
provision
is] properly accommodated by applying a twopart analysis.
First. Section 11 is
satisfied
if the law provides
an injured
person an
effective
and reasonable
alternative
remedy
"by due course of law" for vindication
of his
constitutional
interest...
Second, if there is no substitute
or
alternative
remedy provided, abrogation of the
remedy or cause of action may be
justified
only if there is a clear social or economic
evil to be eliminated
and the elimination
of
an existing
legal remedy is not an
arbitrary
or unreasonable
means for
achieving
the
objective.
Id. at 680 (emphasis added; citations omitted) ; see also Sun Valley
Water Beds v. Herm Hughes & Son, supra.
A statute survives the Berrv analysis if either one of the two
prongs of the analysis is met.

Section 35-1-65 U.C.A., as applied

to Mr. Middlestadt•s claim meets both prongs:

(1) Mr. Middlestadt

had an effective remedy of workersfs compensation benefits of which
he availed himself and (2) though appropriately limited, Sections
35-1-65 and 35-1-66 U.C.A. provides a means to avoid the clear
economic and social evil of the total destitution of industry's
injured by providing benefits to all workers injured or killed
fl

...by

accident

employment..."

arising

out of

and

in the course

of his

(Sections 35-1-45 and 35-1-66, U.C.A.) regardless

of "fault11 of either the employer or the injured employee. In that
manner, the employee is provided a more sure and more speedy
administrative remedy than under the civil tort system which is

-9-

lengthier and less certain.1
Workers1

That give and take is what makes the

Compensation Act Constitutional.

See discussions on

constitutionality contained in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263
U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923); Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148, 28 A.L.R. 1394
(1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923).
Mr. Middlestadt relies heavily on Wrolstad v. Industrial
Comm'n of Utah. supra., in asserting his "open courts" claim.
However, the resolution in that case of the "alternative remedy"
question can be differentiated from the present case. In Wrolstad.
the plaintiff developed asbestosis ten years after leaving his
employment as an electrician. The Commission denied his claim for
disability benefits under the Occupational Disease Act, supra.,
because his total disability did not arise within one year from his
employment as required under Section 35-2-13(a)(2) U.C.A.

In

holding that the statute of repose violated the "open courts"
provision of the Utah Constitution, the Court of Appeals determined

"Workmen's Compensation Acts were designed to correct what had become a generally
recognized eyiL Prior to their enactment, the personal representatives or heirs of a workman killed
in the course; of his employment [or an injured workman] could not recover [damages] unless
negligence on the part of the employer could be established. Moreover, the defenses of contributory
negligence, ... assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule, frequently defeated the cause of
action. Even where recoveries were had, they usually came only after months or years of expensive
litigation, and were largely reduced by attorney's fees and other costs. On the other hand, where
recoveries were allowed, sympathetic juries frequently returned grossly excessive verdicts....
The intention of [workers' compensation! acts, then was to secure
workmen and their dependents ... against becoming objects of charity, by making
reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to the employment, and to make
human wastage in industry part of the cost of production.... Compensation ... has
no relation to fault, is fixed or limited by statute...."
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation. 196 P.2d 487 (Utah 1948) at 493. (Emphasis added.)
-10-

that Mr. Wrolstad had no alternative remedy under the Act.

He

could neither sue in tort because of the Exclusive Remedy Provision
of the Occupational Disease Act nor could he pursue relief under
the Act itself because of the one year repose period.
However, both the facts and the applicable statutory provision
in Wrolstad differ from those at issue in the present case. Here,
Mr. Middlestadt has received substantial benefits.

The benefits

are constitutionally limited by the statutory formula used to
establish the compensation rate, the total number of weeks of
benefits the employer is obligated to pay and by the outside limit
of payments to those incurred within eight years following the
accident.2
Even if the court should consider the eight year benefit
period a statute of limitations or statue of repose, the Berry,
supra., analysis, when applied to Section 35-1-65 U.C.A. does not
result in a violation of the "open courts" provision of the Utah
Constitution.

Alternative remedies were available and benefits

were received by Mr. Middlestadt. Mr. Middlestadt has a continuing
medical benefit if he remains qualified.

There are clear social

and economic evils eliminated by the statute which status is
reasonably and carefully accomplished.

The statute does not

violate the Utah Constitution in any respect.

It should not be forgotten that Middlestadt has the additional benefit
under the Act to permanent total disability benefits from his employer and the
Employer's Reinsurance Fund should he so qualify. . The permanent total
compensation benefit as of the time of his accident had no outside period within
which his claim must be filed so long as the condition of permanent total
disability is causally connected to the industrial accident. Section 35-1-67
U.C.A.

-11-

In the event the court disagrees with the foregoing argument,
it is Respondents position that §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 U.C.A. are
not

violative

of

the

"open

courts11

provision

of

the

Utah

Constitution nor do they violate the equal protection clause of the
Utah Constitution. The courtfs recent decision in the case of Avis
v. Board of Review, supra, although pertaining to a different
section

of

the

Workers1

Compensation

significance with respect to these issues.

Act,

has

particular

In the Avis decision,

the court addressed the constitutionality of §35-1-99 (1974).

The

analysis, however, is equally applicable to a determination as to
the constitutionality of §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 U.C.A.

Clearly,

§35-1-99 is a statute of limitations because the time period runs
from the date of injury and not from a point in time unrelated to
when the cause of action arose. Because of this, this court noted
that "the Berry line of cases is not directly applicable, but we
consider their general constitutional analysis under the open
courts provision."

In the Avis case the court analyzed the

applicability of the case of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission* 786
P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990), the Berry line of cases and multiple
cases dealing with statutes of limitations.

Other cases cited

include Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1992),
Mvers v. McDonald's, 635 P.2d 84, (Utah 1981),

Order of R.R.

Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.
Ct. 582, 586 (1944).

None were found applicable.

Also in the Avis case, this court cited, McHenry v. Utah
Vallev Hospital. 724 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Utah 1989) for the
-12-

proposition that state legislatures possess the discretion to enact
statutes of limitations and that these statutes are presumptively
constitutional and M [A] statute of limitations is constitutionally
sound if it should allow a reasonable, not unlimited time in which
to bring suit.11

Id,

This court specifically addressed the matter of alternative
remedies in the Avis decision and the analysis seems equally
applicable to the instant case.

The court said:

Petitioner
knew of his injury on July 4, 1968.
He
received medical treatment for his injury and was aware
of recurring back pain over a period of several
years.
Therefore,
even though Petitioner
did not seek a
disability
rating or file a compensation claim
until
twenty-two
years after his accident,
he knew of his
injury and could have filed for compensation within the
statutory
period.
Petitioner
seeks a rule which would
postpone running of the statute until he "discovered" the
full extent of his injury.
The workers'
compensation
statute,
however, does not require stabilization
before
filing for benefits.
Petitioner's
argument that he had
no alternative
remedy because the Workers' Compensation
Act is his exclusive
remedy, also fails because under
either
the act or a civil
tort action,
he would be
subject to a statute
of limitations.
His
alternative
remedy was to timely
file.
We conclude that the statute of limitations
found in Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-99 does not, on its face, manifest a
denial of justice
that would require us to overcome the
statute's
presumption of constitutionality.
It provides
a reasonable time to file a claim, dating from the date
of injury.
See McHenry 724 Fed. Supp. at 83 7 (upholding
the constitutionality
of Utah's four-year
statute
of
limitations
for civil actions) . We further conclude that
the statute as applied to petitioner
does not violate
the
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution because he
knew of his injury within the limitations
period.
This

court

in

Avis

went

on

to

comment

about

the

inapplicability of the equal protection clause of the constitution
by stating:
-13-

The staxtute of limitations
in §35-1-99 classifies
injured
workers in a reasonable
manner in that all
injured
workers are subject to the same limitations
period
within
which to file
a claim for compensation.
An injured
workers disability
rating is a component that is
separate
and distinct
from the actual compensation claim, and the
workers responsibility
is to timely file
within
the
statutory
period with or without a disability
rating in
hand. We also conclude that limiting
the compensation
claim period for workers bears a reasonable
relationship
to the achievement of a legitimate
legislative
purpose.
Limiting compensation claims to a three-year period from
the date of the accident protects employers and the State
of Utah Second Injury Fund from having to defend
stale
claims—a legitimate
legislative
purpose.
If anything, the three-year limitation for filing claims is
more restrictive than the eight-year limit for paying claims as set
forth in §35-1-65 and §35-1-66.

There is no logical distinction

between the two so far as the open courts provision and the equal
protection

clause are concerned.

In the

instant

case, the

Applicant received all benefits due him at the time he filed his
claim.
CONCLUSION
The outside limitation within which compensation payments must
be incurred is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of
repose.

It is, rather, a reasonable limit to the benefits allowed

under the Workers1 Compensation Act of Utah.
If the court should consider the eight year benefit period a
statute of limitations or statute of repose, the Berry, supra.,
analysis, when applied to §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 U.C.A. does not
result

in a violation of the

"open courts11 provision nor a

violation of the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution.
Alternative remedies were available and benefits were received by
-14-

Mr. Middlestadt. Mr. Middlestadt has a continuing medical benefit
if he remains qualified. There are clear social and economic evils
eliminated by the statute which status is reasonably and carefully
accomplished. The statue does not violate the Utah Constitution in
any respect.
DATED this

10

i&>

day of November, 1992,
Comtrol Inc. and
Workers Compensation Fund

*£
DATED this

IJBL

Richard G. Sumsion
Attorney for Respondents
day of November, 1992.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker

James<t!l7 Black
Co-Gfoimsel for Respondents
Com*brol, Inc. and
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
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the following on this
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Hans Mo Scheffler
311 South State Street #380
S a l t Lcike C i t y , UT

84111

Theodore E. Kanell
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT
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Benjamin J. Sims
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT

84111

Erie Boorman, Administrator
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0250
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ADDENDUM

1. Utah Constitution Article I, Sections 11 and 24
2. U.C.A, Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred, from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

35-1-66. Partial disability—Scale of payments.—Where the injury
causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such
disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight
years from the date of the injury, compensation equal to 66 2/3% of the
difference between that employee's average weekly wages before the
accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter,
but not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week and in addition thereto $5 for a
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age
of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children,
but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week.
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at
any time prior to eight years after the date of injury to any employee
whose physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed
and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period.
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability,
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of
compensation.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends,
or the death of the injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 2/3%
of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but
not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per
week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent
minor children, but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition
to the compensation hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability,
to wit:
(A) to (C) • * • [Same as parent volume.]
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and
paid as follows:
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second (cps)
using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of
hearing impairment Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above
2000 cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable
disability,

36-1-65. Temporary disability—Amount of payments—State average
weekly wage defined.—(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee
•hall receive 6654% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury
so long as such disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100%
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and
$5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to
a maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not
to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury.
(2) • • • [Same as parent volume].
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*
Applicant,

•

*«*«!*

*
*

ORDER DENYING

*

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY and/or
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY, COMTROL,
INC., and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH, and EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
*
*
*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Defendants.

*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant which was received on December 17, 1991 in the
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
On April 2, 1985, the administrative law judge (ALJ) entered
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the
applicant benefits which arose from industrial accidents which
occurred on August 16, 1976, and December 5, 1980. Subsequent to
the 1985 order, the applicant had two surgeries on his back for
which he seeks additional workers 7 compensation benefits.
Applicant claims that at the request of defendants' counsel,
an attorneys' conference was held on November 19, 1991. He also
claims that after the defendants' counsel had briefly outlined the
present claim to the ALJ, the ALJ stated that applicant had no
further claim to benefits based upon the dates of the industrial
accidents, but that the defendants must pay the applicant's medical
expenses pursuant to the April 2, 1985 order.
On November 21,
1991, the ALJ entered an Order of Dismissal which stated that there
was no justiciable issue at that time.
Applicant alleges that he cannot respond to the order since no
motion was made by defendants, and since the ALJ failed to state
the basis for the order.
However, applicant states that he
understands that the ALJ's statement at the hearing indicated that
defendants must pay the medical expenses related to his industrial
accident. Defendant Workers Compensation Fund does not dispute its
responsibility
Cor payment of these medical expenses.
The
disconnect arises as to whether the defendants are obligated to pay
for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) and permanent
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partial disability compensation
additional surgeries.

(PPC) in connection with the

Applicant claims that the defendants are obligated for the
TTC, and PPC,, and that the IC has continuing jurisdiction to make
them comply. The defendants argue that the eight year statute of
limitations has run under U.C.A. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66.
The pertinent portion of Section 35-1-65 which discusses TTC
provides:
...In no case shall such compensation benefits
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury
ov€»r a period of eight years from the date of the
injury*
U.C.A. Section 35-1-65 (1953 as amended 1977).
The pertinent portion of Section 35-1-66 which discusses PPC
provides:
Th€i commission may make a permanent partial
disability award at any time prior to eight
yeairs after the date of injury to an employee* whose physical condition resulting from
such injury is not finally healed and fixed
eight years after the date of injury and who
files an application for such purpose prior
to the expiration of such eight-year period.
U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 (1953 as amended 1977).
Our reading of the above statutes indicates that the applicant
could not receive TTC for any period outside the eight year period
from the date of injury, and in the case of PPC he must have
actually filed his application within such eight year period.
We will examine the relevant dates to see if the statutory
mandate has been met.
Applicant's latest injury occurred on
December 5, 1980. The last day for filing would have been December
5, 1988.
Applicant filed on May 20, 1991.
This filing was
therefore time barred.
Applicant claims that the payment of benefits by defendants
under the April 1985 order shows that defendants have admitted
responsibility, and that this somehow tolls the statute of
limitations. He cites United Parcel v. Ind. Comm'n. 809 P.2d 139,
141-142 (Utah App. 1991) for this proposition.
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The United Parcel case is inapplicable since the tolling
provision relied upon in United Parcel became effective after the
date of Mr. Middlestadt's injuries. Jd. at 141. In the instant
case, the provisions of Section 35-1-99 which apply to Mr.
Middlestadt mention no tolling provision, and further, defendant
Workers Compensation Fund is correct when it states that neither
United Parcel nor Section 35-1-99 apply in Mr. Middlestadt's case.
The statutes of limitation in Section 35-1-99 do not apply,
and the relevant statutes of limitation are contained in Sections
35-1-65 and 66 which have been discussed previously.
Although the ALJ's order could have elaborated more on his
reasons for dismissing applicant's claim, and the finding of no
justiciable issue to be litigated, we believe that the application,
the answer, and the order provide sufficient information on which
to base a dismissal. The application was dated on May 20, 1991,
and was apparently filed on that date or later. Applicant claimed
two injuries, one on August 16, 1976, and the other on December 5,
1980. Both of these dates are well beyond eight years from the
date of filing of the application.
Defendant Workers Compensation
Fund's answer to the
application clearly states at Paragraph Numbers Three and Five that
any compensation based on the dates of injury alleged by applicant
would be wholly barred by statutes of limitation.
Finally, applicant states that the Utah Constitution
guarantees him a legal remedy for an injury done to his person. He
cites Wrolstad v. Ind. Comm'n. 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990) for
this proposition. The factual situation in the instant case is
completely different. The applicant's injuries occurred, claims
were filed, an order was entered, benefits were paid, and medical
expenses related to the industrial injury will continue to be taken
care of.
In Wrolstad. the filing requirement based on Mr.
Wrolstad's disease expired prior to the cause of action arising.
This occurred in Mr. Wrolstad's case because of the extended
latency period of his disease. Since the Sections 35-1-65 and 66
are not bridled with the constitutional infirmity of Wrolstad. we
must uphold these statutes of limitation.
For all the previously stated reasons, we therefore hold that
the ALJ's decision when viewed in the perspective of the entire
record is substantially supported by the evidence.
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of Dismissal of the
administrative law judge dated November 21, 1991 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
Case No.
PAUL J MIDDLESTADT,

*

Applicant,

*

UTAH

**'?*. * ?I

91000560

*

VS.

*

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
and/or CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY; COMTROL and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND; and EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

*

Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter having been duly considered, and it
having been determined that:

xx

1.

Respond to request for documentation.

2.

Provide medical records.

3.

Cooperate in investigating the case.

4.

Actively prosecute this matter.

5.

Other: There is no justiciable issue at this time.

And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for
dismissing the claim,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant
be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or specific
written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission within
thirty (30) days from date of this Order, or it shall be the final
Order of the Commission, not sjubject to furtjieg^eview or appeal.

0. rw^

len
Law Judge
Certified this
November 1991.
ATTEST:

21st

/s/ Patricia Ashby
Patricia Ashby
Commission Secretary

day of
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PAUL J. HIDDKLSTADT,
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COKTtOL* IMCOtPOtATO
tad/or STAT1 IW1PUHCT HMD,
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nutnor PURD,

•

rzaozaos or PACT
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CORCUJSIORS or LAV

*
*
*
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*

Dafaadaata.

a
a
•

HA1XRQ:

Raarias too* 334* ladastrial Coaamisaioa of Otab, 160
last 300 toatb. Salt Laba Citf, Otab, oa Jaly 1*,
19S4, at 0:30 A.R. O'clock. Said Mario* was paraaaat
to Ordor aad Hot lea of tba Cossmittioa.

SaTOlS:

Tiaotby C. Allaa, AdRlaittratiaa Lav Jadga.

APPKAKAMCSS:

Tba Applicaat was praaaat aad raprataatad by Cbarias
R. Sroua, Jr., Attoraay at Law.
Tba Dafaadaata, Coatrol, lac., aad/or Stata Xaaaraaca
Paad, vora praaaat aad raprataatad by Sraca Ullaoa,
Attoraay at Uaf.
Tba Dafaadaata* Moaataia Paal Supply aad/or Coatiaaatal
Caaaaltf• aara rapraaaatad by P. &« Pataraoa, Attoraay
at

At tba eoaclaaioa of tba Svidaatiary Moarlai, tba awdical itanas aad
qaattioat Mara submittad to a Radical Paaal appoiatad by tba Adaialstratlva
Law Judga. Tba Radical Paaal Raport vat racaivad, aad eoplat vara dlatributad
to tba partIat. Tba Stata Xaaaraaca Paad, by aad tbroafb coaatal, fllad a
taquaat for ClarlfUatloa of tba Radical Paaal taport, wblcb was forward** to
tba Radical Paaal. A Sapplaawatal Paaal taport vat racaivad aad copiat vara
dittribatad to tba partiaa. Piftaaa (IS) dayt bavia* alaptad tiaca tba
mailiaa of taid Sapplaawatal Radical Paaal taport* aad ao Objactioat baviac
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been received tbarato; tba Radical Paeel teeort and tba Supplemental raael
iaport ara adaiittad lato evidence.

FXMDXMCS or FACT:
tba Applicant* a first Injury to bis back occurred la approtimately
1974. As a raaalt of this non-industrial back injury, ba eveetually received
an LS-Sl discectomy froai J. Lynn Smith, M. D. Tba Applicant was fcsmporarlly
totallr dlaablad for approsimately sit mouths, aad bad ao fartbar problems
with his back aatil August 16, 1976, while working for Mountain Paal Supply.
Oa that data, tba Applicant was employed as a utility men, and was c bang lag a
meter ia aa old house* Ha juapad from a foar foot ladga aad twiatad bia back,
and hud aa iasasdiata "electric jolt" down bis laft lag froai tba hip to tba
kaaa. Tba Applicant than bad a char 11a borsa ia bia appar laft thigh for a
coapla of waaks following tba injury, and also aoticad burning in bia laft hip
acroas tha small of tba back. On August 27, 1976, Mr. Middalstadt was aaaa by
Dr. J. Lynn Smith, complaining of burning in bis lag and laft hip. Dr. Smith
bad him start with physical tbarapy aad abdication, but tba therapy mada bia
condition worsa. Ha coatinaad with coaaervative cara until approsimataly
Saptaaibar IS, 1976, wham ba was admit tad to tba St. Mark's Hospital by Dr.
Smith. Dr. Smith parformad an aiploration of Le-5 on Saptambar 22, 1976, but
nothing was discovered, further asploratlon waa coaductad at L5-31, and
revealed scar tiasua which waa removed, and tha Doctor also parformad a
foramiaotomy. Mr. Middalstadt had an uneventful recovery, and that wintar
quarter atartad commarcial art classaa. Aa a raault, ha waa required to sit
oa a stool and aftar doing so, notiead that ba waa havieg a burning aanaation
bctweoe his shoaldar bladaa. In Saptambar of 1977, tba Industrial Commlssioa
approved a Compensation Agraamant, wharaby tba Applicant waa paid a five
percent permanent partial impairment award of IS .6 weeks payable at the rate
of $112.67 or a total of $1,7$7.63, for the industrial injury of August 16,
1976.
In Movember of 1978, the Applicant relocated to Denver, where he
started a construction company with his two brothers. The Applicant's job waa
to do tha estimating, and make arraagemeats for the delivery of materials, bat
he did aot do hard labor. Durlag this time, the Applicaat bad ao burning paia
ia his back. Ia August of I960, Hr. Hlddelatadt returned from Deover, and
started working for the Defendant, Comtrol,, Inc. Comtrol waa eagaged ia the
remodeliag of the Playhouae Theatre ia downtown Salt Lake City, and they were
alao pouring concrete plantar bosea ia front of the LDS Church Offlea
Boilding. On December S, 1980, Mr. Hiddelstadt sustained aa Industrial injury
whilii lifting graaita caps from tha plaatera, which weighed anywhere from 350
to 450 pounds. Hr. Middelatadt waa ia tha back of a pickup truck with his
lead maa, whea tha laad man slipped, sad the Applicaat had the full weight of
the cap for a oae foot drop. He had aa immediate electric jolt down his laft
leg, which then subsided. On his drive home, he aot Iced that ha bad a burning
In the laft hip. He coatinaad to work however aatil December 24, I960, whea
he was laid eff due to a reduction ia force.
At that time, he
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was havlag cramping aad so bo made aa eppolntmeat to soo Dr. J. Lyaa Ssiitb.
Dr. Saltb was first ablo to soo tbo Applleaat oa Jaauary *. 1981, aad
placod bis oa a physical tborapy program tad told bla to stay off work. Tbo
Applleaat startod receiving temporary total eoapeasatloa from tbo S U U
Insurance fuad as of Jaaoary S 9 1981, aad coatiaaod to receive tbo same aatll
December 31, 1981. Baaed oa tbo Applleaat's testlmoay, It weald appoar tbat
bo bas booa oadorpald temporary total disability for tbo porlod December 25.
19*0 to aad Including Jaaoary 4 9 1981 or a porlod of oao week aad five days.
Tbo Applleaat eoatlaaod with followup visits to Dr. Saltb, but when
bis eoaditioa did aot improve, bo was roforrod oa January 29, 1981 for aa
8MB. Tbo BMC was negative, so bo was eoatlaaod oa physical tborapy aad
conservative eara. Towards tbo oad of lurch, 1981, Mr. Hiddolstadt was bavin*
a lot of difficulty, so Dr. Saltb roforrod bla for a CT Scaa. Tbo Seaa
ladieatod a pott 1 bla dise fragment, so tbo Applleaat was adalttod to St.
Mark's Hospital, aad oa April 15, 1981, Dr. Saltb roaovod sear tissue froa
L5-S1. Approximately two or tbroo days after bis discharge, tbo Applleaat
fall while takiag a shower, aad bis wound startod bloodies,. When be returned
to the Doctor, be was advised tbat be bad aa iafectioa. After a course of
aatibiodies9 Mr. Hiddolstadt bad a severe ease of dyseatery. After bis
diarrhea had cleared, bis left knee beeaae quite swollea. Be waa tboa
bospltalUed at St. Mark's Hospital oa May 18, 1981. It waa initially felt
tbat the Applleaat bad aa iafectioa la bis kaoe 9 bat a subseqeeat diagaosit
was aade of Baiter's Syndrome or septle arthritis. Tbo Applleaat was sooa by
Dr. Saltb for the balaaeo of tbo summer.
Oa Septeaber 24, 1981, Mr. Mlddeletadt was sees by Dr. Dituri, la aa
ladepeadent aedical exeaiaatloe arraafed by tbo State Zasuraace Puad. Dr.
Dituri fouad that the Applleaat bad a 21 permanent partial iapairaeat of the
whole body due to the Belter's Syndrome la bis left kaee9 as a result of the
industrial aceident of Deeeaber 5, 1980 aad aa additional 5X of the low back
due to the saae industrial injury. Thereafter, the Commission approved a
Statemoat and Bequest based oa Dr. Dituri*s ratlags.
Following this
settlement of Jaauary 12, 1982, the Applleaat bad ao further problems until
approximately March of 1983.
At that time, he was working for Udisco, welch is the wholesale
braaeb of Suatet Sports, pulling orders for sporting goods stores. This job
requirod the Applleaat to push a small grocery cart dowa isles, aad involvod
bending, twisting, turning, whils removing fishing equlpmeat ead light gue
ports from various bins. As the Applleaat was straightening up from bending
over, sometime in March of 1983, bo aoticed a spasm or muscle pull In his low
back in the area of hit kidneyt. Me eoatlaued to beve this aaggiag backache,
aad when it did not go away, be saw Dr. J. Lyaa Saltb on March IS, 1983. At
that time, the Applicant was complaining of pa la radiatiag iato the left hip
dowa the leg. He waa givea modi cat loa aad told to return la oae week. The
Applicant did so. aad upoa bla return wes givea physical therapy aad
abdication. The beat treatmeett givea by the tberepist however, worseaed the
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Applicant's coodltloo9 so this woo dlscoatlnuad. Too Applicant roportod that
tho burning bo bad at this tiaa woo la a dlffaraat aroa tbaa It bad booa
provioosly.
On March 31, 1983 tba Applicant racalvod a CT team, which iodleatod a
baralatad disc at LS-S1, on tba laft a&da. Mr. Hiddalitadt waa raadalttad to
St. Mark's Hospital and on April 6, 1983 Dr. Saith parfonaad a diacactoay aad
lysis of adhaaioaa. Tba partlaa stlpulatad tbat tba Applicant waa taaporarily
totally dlaablad from April 1, 1983 to and including July 1, 1983. tba
Applicant than raturnad to work* but contlnuad to hava laft lag paia, so bo
waa raadaittad to tba Hospital on July 10, 1983. Ha tbaa bad furtbar surgary
oa July 13, 1983 fro» Dr. labaiaar aad Dr. SaUtb. Tba Applicant Bubaofooatly
rataraad to work oa Octobar 29, 1983 at ftuasot Sports. Hr. Middalstadt was
laat aaaa by Dr. J. Lynn Smith la Octobar of 1983. Tba Applicant coaplaias of
problaaa la bit right hip, which atartad following tba sargary of April 6,
1983.
VItb tba filo la this poatura, tba caaa waa rafarrad to a Hadical
Paaal for ita a valuation. Tho Paaal found tbat tba Applicant baa a 15X
paranaaat partial iapairaaat duo to pro-ailatiag coadltloas, with 101 baiag
dua to tho pra-aiiatlng back iajury, sod 3X baiag daa to tba loitor's
Syadroaa. With ragard to tho iadaatrlal injury of August la, 1974, tba
Hadical Paaal foaad a 2.5X iapalnaaat dua to tbat injury, aad a 2.SX
iapairaaat dua to tba iadaatrlal injury of Dacaafcor 5, 1980. Tba Paaal also
found that tha aargariaa of April 4, 1983 aad July 13, 1983 wara aacaaaitatad
by tha aggragata combination of tha industrial injuria* of Dacoabar S v 1980*
August 16, 1976, aad tha aoa-ioduatrial iajory of 1974. Tha Paaal atatad that
"If it had not baan for tha prior surgurUs (aicl and Injuria* tha aurgary of
4/6/83 would aot hava takaa placa." Tha Adaiaistrativa Law Judga adopts tha
Findings of tha Hadical Paaal at hit owa.
Xa aaaaaalag tha liability for panaaaaat partial iapairaaat dua to aa
industrial injury, it la aacaaaary to utlllaa tha formula aat forth io tha
Hair caaa. That caaa providaa that tha iapalnaaat dua to tha industrial
injury la aaaaaaad aa agaiaat tha raavUalng uaiapairad paraoa at tba tiaa of
tha industrial Injury, la tha iaataat caaa, tha Applicant on Auguat 16, 1976
would hava baan an 85X uniapairnd aaa for rat lag purposas. Accordingly, whoa
tha 2.5X dua to tha induatrial Injury of Auguat 16, 1976 is appliad to tha 85X
raaaiaiag uniapairad paraoa, 2.123X raaulta, or whoa roundad to tha naaraat
whola nuabar 2X.
Oa Dacaabar 5, 1980, tha Applicant waa aa 83X uaiapairad paraoa,
which whaa aultlpliad by tha 2.5X raaultlag from tha induatrial iajury of
Dacaabar 5, 1980, rasultt ia an iapairaaat of 2.073% or 2X whaa roundad to tba
naaraat whola nuabar. Tha Applicant's total iapalnaaat froa all cauaaa aad
conditions is 19X of tha whola paraoa. Purauaat to Saction 69 of tha Act, tba
aaaloyar, Hoaataia Pual, ia aatitlad to ralaburaaaaat froa tha Sacoad Injury
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Puad for tbo overpayaeat of peraaaeat partial Iapairaaat aa a reeult of tbo
industrial injury of August 16, 1*76. Accordlot to tbo flit, tbo Carrior for
Mooatala Pool, Coatlaoatal Caaaalty, bat paid tbo Applicant IS.a weeks at tbo
rata of $112.67 par week for a total of 11,757.65 for a 51 peraaaeat partial
lmpalrmoat, Pursuant to tbo finding of tbo Radical Paaol, tbo Applicaat
should have received 21 or 6.24 weeks at tbo rata of $112.67 or a total of
$703.06, tboroby resulting la aa overpayaeat of $1,054.59 by Coetlaeatal
Caaaalty which aboald bo reiaborsed by tbo Secoad Injury Puad, aad should thea
bo croditod by tbo Secoad Injury m o d as egaiast tboir liability to tbo
Applicant. Tbo Stato Inauraaca Pood baa alao over paid peraaaeat partial
iapairaaat benefits to tbo Applicaat aa a roatalt of tbo industrial iajury of
December 5, I960. Tbo State Insurance Puad has paid 21.64 weeks at tbo rata
of $153.00 par week or a total of $3,341.52 for a 71 peraaaeat partial
iapairaaat. Tba Nodical Paaol fouad tbat tbo iapairaaat dua to tbo iadaatrial
iajury was actually 21, or 6.24 weeks at tbo rata of $153.00 par week for a
total of $954.72, tboroby aaklns aa overpayaeat by tbo Itato Xaauraaeo Puad of
* 2 , m . * 0 , ufbtca aboald bo reimbursed by tba Secoad Injury fuad aad credited
by tbo Socoad Iajury Puad aa egaiast tboir liability to tbo Applicaat. Witb
roapoct to relaburseaeet of teaporary total disability aad aadical espeeses,
Coatlaoatal Caaaalty la oatltlod to reiaberseaeat froa tbo Socoad Iajury Puad
for 15/17 or 661 of tbo aaouats tboy bavo previously paid for teaporary total
coapoaaatioa aad/or aadleal aapoaaoa oa behalf of tbo Applicaat aa a roault of
tbo industrial iajury of Aeaust 16, 1976. Tbo ftata laauraaco Puad ia
aatitlod to roiaburaoaaat for 15/19 or 791 of tbo aaoaata tboy bavo previously
paid for taaporary total coapoaaatioa aad/or aad leal aapoaaoa oa boaalf of tbo
Applicaat aa a roaalt of tbo iadaatrial injury of Pocoabar 5, 1960.
Finally, concerning tba axpoaaaa of tbo surgeries of April 6, 1983
aad July 13, 1983, tba Administrative Law Judge adopts tba Findings of tbo
Hadical Paaol witb roapoct to tbo relative contributions of tba Dafaadaata for
tba oaod for tbo aaaa. Ia otbor words, tbo Ada!alucrative Law Judge faala
that tba bast approach with raapoct to tbaaa aadical aipaaaaa aad attaadaat
periods of taaporary total disability, ia to have tba Stata Inauraaca Puad pay
tba Applicant's banafits in tba first instance ia this regard. However, the
State laauraaca Fund aball be oatltlod to reiaburaeaeat froa the Second Injury
Fund for 15/19 or 761 of tba aedical eipensas aad teaporary total coapeaaatioa
for the lateat two surgeries. Ia addition, tbo State laauraaca Puad shall
alao be oatltlod to roiaburaoaaat froa Coatlaoatal Caaaalty for 2/19 or 111 of
the aadical axpoaaaa aad teaporary total disability for the laat two
surgerlea.
The Applicaat aball alao be aatitlod to aa award froa the Secoad
Injury Fuad for his 151 permanent partial lapalraeat due to pre-existing
conditions, which would entitle hia to aa award of 46.8 weeks payable at the
rate of $153.00 or a total of $7,160.40. However, the Secoad Injury Puad is
entitled to a credit for their ralaburaeaeat of the overpayaeats aade by
Continental Caaaalty aad the Stato laauraaca Fund of their reapoaaibillty for
permanent partial iapairaaat beaeflts, tboroby entitling the Applicaat to a
oat lump sua of $3,719.01 for poraaaoat partial iapairaaat benefits.
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COtJCUttlOHS OT LAW:
Paul J. Xiddalstadt i t a a t l t l a d to tsorkar's coapanaatioa baaafltt for
tha industrial accidaatt of August 16, 1976 and Dacatbar 5, I960.
OtDttJ
XT XS THinrotl OtDttID that Dafandants, Mountain fual Supply and/or
Coatlnantal Casualty, shall ralabursa tba ttata Iaturaaca Fund, for 111 of tha
amounts paid by tho Stata Xnsuraaca fund for tsaporary total disability and
aadical axpaasas as tha rasalt of tha surgarias of April 6, 1963 and July 13,
1963. Said raiabursaaant to ba aada upon tba racaipt of a ratltioa from tba
Stata Xasuraaca fund indicating tba amounts so aspaadad.
XT XS FUKI8II OtDttID that tba Dafaadaats, Hoantain fual Supply
and/or Continantal Casualty, sball ba aatltlad to reistorsaaaat from tba
Sacood Injury fund for tba sua of $703.06, ufcicb sua rapraaaats tba ovar
payaant by tba Dafaadaats of tbair liability for paraanant partial iapairaaat
banafits as a rasult of tba industrial injury of August 16, 1976.
XT XI F U K K t OUMOtED tnat tba Dufuadanti. Mountain Fual Supply
and/or Coatlnantal Caaaalty, sball bo aatltlad to raiabursaaant from tba
Sacood Injury Fund for SSI of any previously paid taaporary total coapanaatioa
and/or aadical axpaasas as a rasult of tba industrial injury of August 16,
1976; said raiabursaaant to ba bad apon tba oubaissioo of a Variflad ratltioa
to tba Administrator of tba Sacond Injury Fund indicating tba amounts so
axpandad.
XT XS rUtTHSt OSOtStO that tha Dafaadaata, Coatrol, Inc. and/or Stata
Xasuraaca Fund* pay Paal Hlddalstadt, coapanaatioa at tha rata of $213.00 par
waak for 1.S71 vaaks or a total of $336.62, as taaporary total coapaaaatloa
for tha pariod Dacaabar 25, 1980 to and including January 4, 1981; said
banafits to ba paid In a lump sua.
XT XS FUtTHtt OSDKttO that Dafaadanta, Coatrol, Inc. and/or Stata
Xnsuraaca Fund, pay all aadical axpaasas iacurrad as tha raault of tha
surgarias of April 6 9 19S3 and July 13, 19S3; aaid axpaaaaa to ba paid ia
accordanca with tha aadical and Surgical Fua Scbadula of tba Industrial
Coamiasion of Utah.
XT XS FUtTHM OtDttID that Dafaudaafes, Coatrol, Inc. aad/or Stata
Xnsuraaca Fund, pay Faal Hlddalstadt, coapaaaatloa at tha rata of $213.00 par
vaak for 29 waaks or a total of $6,177.00, as coapanaatioa for taaporary total
disability rasult lag from tba surgarias of April 6, 1963 and July 13, 1983;
said banafits to ba paid ia a luap sua, laaa tba attoraay's faa to ba awardad
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XT XS PUKTXIt ORDERED that Defendants, Coatrol, lac. aad/or State
Insurance Puad, pay Char las H. Srown, Jr., Attoraey for tha Applieaat, tha sua
of $2,0*0.12, for services rasdarad la thla matter, tha same to ba dadaetad
froai tha aforasaid award to tha Applieaat aad remitted directly to his of flea.
XT IS PURTHEt OtMtBD that tha Dafaadaata, Control, lac. aad/or Stata
Insurance Pund, shall ba aatitlad to reimbureemeat from tha Sacoad Injury Puad
for 781 of tha medical axpaaaaa aad temporary total disability resulting from
tha surgeries of April 4, 1983 aad July 13, 1983, aaid relatoirsemeat to ba had
upoa tha submission of a Varlfiad Patltloa to tha Admiaiatretor of tha Sacoad
Injury Pund iadieatias tha amooats ao expended.
XT XS FURTHER OBDBBBO that tha Admiaiatrator of tha Sacoad Injury
Pund prapara tha aacassary vouchers directing tha Stata Traasurar, as
Cuatodlaa of tha Sacoad Injary Puad, to reimburse tha Stata Iasuraaca Puad ia
tha emoeat of 12*384.80, which sum raprasaats tha overpeymcat by tha Stata
lasuranea Puad of parmaaaat partial Impel rmeat beeeflts aa a rasult of tha
Industrial injury of December S, 1980.
IT XS POTTHEt OEDCRtD that tha Stata Iasuraaca Puad shall ba aatitlad
to reimbursemeat from tha Sacoad Injury Puad for 791 of tha paat temporary
total coapansatioa aad madical aspaasoa previously paid oa bahalf of tha
Applieaat aa a rasult of tha ladustrial injury of December $, 1980, said
reimbursement to ba had upoa tha submission of a Yariflad Patltioo to tha
Administrator of tha Sacoad lajury Puad indicating tha amounts so axpaadad.
IT IS rURTHER ORDERED that tha Administrator of tha Second Injury
Pund prapara tha aacassary vouchors directing tha Stata Traasurar, as
Custodian of tha Sacond Injury Pund, to pay to Paul Hiddelstadt, compansatioa
at tha rata of $153.00 par week for 46.8 weeks or a total of $7,160.40, as
compensation for tha 1S1 parmaaaat partial impairment due to pre-existing
conditions;
the Second Injury Pund shall be entitled to a credit of
$1,054.59, for the overpeymeat reimbursed to Coatiaeatal Caaualty, aad
$2,386.80 reimbursed to the Stata Inauraaca Puad for Its overpayment, thereby
leaving a aet award due aad owing the Applieaat la a lump sum of $3,719.01.
IT XS FURTHER ORDERED that any motion for tavlew of the foregoing
ahall be filed la writing within fifteca (13) daya of the date hereof
specifying In detail tha particular errors aad Objections, aad unless ao
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